Abstract
to who can best explain the reasons behind the emergence of the crisis and how best to resolve the challenges facing the Euro. Germany has taken center stage in the Eurozone crisis, due to its economic strength and the key role of Chancellor Angela Merkel in negotiating the response to the crisis. Merkel sought to project a narrative that both asserts Germany's commitment to European integration and chastises Eurozone members for their economic failures. In this way, Merkel has projected a narrative of promoting budgetary rigor and austerity, thereby portraying the crisis as being caused by overwhelming national debt, rather than as a result of structural weaknesses or imbalances in the Euro area. Merkel has attempted to dominate the narrative of the Eurozone crisis to shut out policy alternatives, which could have negatively impacted on Germany. Her longevity as German chancellor, while colleagues in other Eurozone countries have been voted out of office, has added weight to her voice, despite some of the inconsistencies we highlight below. Merkel's domestic credibility and electoral success demonstrated yet again in September 2013 has rested on her handling of the Eurozone crisis. In this article we highlight how the German government has sought to narrate a story of the cause of the Eurozone crisis.
Our key argument is that by tracing how Merkel's governments have sought to narrate the Euro crisis we can highlight the difficulties of presenting a strategic narrative that offers a resolution to the crisis consistent with both German domestic preferences and with historical memory, and is acceptable to Eurozone members. 2 In addition to this, a focus on the German strategic narrative highlights instances when Merkel seeks to explain policy shifts through metanarratives of German European policy as a means to secure domestic support.
Our analysis is divided into two parts. In the first section, we explain how previous Hajer's study on how stories in environmental policy negotiations have been central to reaching global agreements on highly complex policies is central to our analysis.
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The relevance of stories is especially visible in the Eurozone crisis, in the context of which domestic and EU-level narratives of member states and institutions collide.
Schmidt and Claudio Radaelli argue that discourse underpins narrative constructions within policy debates. They suggest:
The story the discourse tells and the information it provides must … appear sound, the actions it recommends doable, the solutions to the problems it identifies workable, and the overall outcomes appropriate. … the discourse does better if it contains cognitive arguments that demonstrate the policy programme's relevance, applicability and coherence; and normative arguments that resonate with long-standing or newly-emerging values, and that complement rather than contradict the cognitive arguments. a bargain was only possible as French and German leaders gradually agreed to common solutions and justified them at home by using frames that are deeply historically rooted in their national traditions and thus resonate within respective public opinions. 10 We also assert that communication is therefore central to understanding the Euro crisis. Our focus on narrative analysis in public policy emphasizes processes of identifying the nature of the problem at stake, outlining a solution to that problem, and indicating what the outcome will be.
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This article contends that states and other actors face great incentives to project strategic narratives in the context of an evolving media ecology in which politics takes place, and that narratives are an essential element in understanding the crisis.
The Euro crisis has reinforced the interconnectivity of European economies, leading to greater public awareness of the impact of European issues on national policies. We define strategic narrative as a means for political actors to construct a shared meaning of the past, present, and future of international politics in order to shape the behavior of domestic and international actors. 12 In the case of the Eurozone crisis, strategic narratives legitimate policy responses, reinforce domestic and international support, and challenge counternarratives. 13 The concept of strategic narrative is a tool to understand how political actors seek to extend their influence, manage expectations and change the discursive environment in which they operate. These are narratives both about states and about the system itself-both about "who we are" and about "what kind of order we want." Narratives link seemingly unconnected phenomena to create a sense of causal transformation through a compelling explanation of the situation at hand. 14 Narratives often seek to establish order from confusion or complexity. 15 Strategic narratives are representations of identity, a sequence of events, a communicative tool through which political elites attempt to give determined meaning to past, present, and future in order to achieve political objectives. Amelia Arsenault and Monroe Price argue: "narratives that are strategic are anthems to the future of the state." 16 The German government engages in substantial efforts to influence domestic and international opinion of the merits of their approach to the crisis, often encountering opposition to its understanding of the causes and solution. Strategic narratives are therefore employed and deployed by German actors to pursue their preferences and shape the expectations of third parties. 17 Despite Germany's position as the most powerful economic actor in the EU, it has not been able unilaterally to impose its preferences on the EU. Jeffrey Legro notes that "international relations are shaped not just by the power states have but the ideas the states hold about how that power should be used." 18 The Euro crisis, William E. Paterson argues, has catapulted
Germany into a hegemonic role that it embraces only reluctantly. 19 That increase in Germany's relative power in the EU has not resulted in Merkel being able unilaterally to decide policy. Finnemore suggests that,
[t]he policies (of a great power) must reflect values held at home, making them legitimate domestically. At the same time, in order to induce acquiescence or support from abroad, they must appeal to the leaders and publics of the other states. Constructing policies across these two spheresdomestic and international-may be more or less difficult, depending on circumstances, but the range of choices satisfying both constituencies is unlikely to be large. 20 Merkel has found it a difficult balancing act to continue to demonstrate Germany's European credentials, while at the same time attempting to impose Germany's solution to the Eurozone crisis and minimize Germany's exposure to risk. Demands from France and the U.S. for Germany to contribute more to the Euro "big bazooka"
to defend the currency from the market placed Merkel under intense pressure. 21 Merkel's strategic narrative sought to minimize Germany's exposure and explain inevitable compromises emanating from negotiations when they occurred through narrative constructions of how the policy responses developed.
Germany's Narratives of the European Union
Metanarratives of Germany's role in Europe and the world have informed postwar politics in Germany. 26 We suggest that these apparently "suboptimal outcomes" are examples of the power that narrative asserts over policy discussions. Narratives commit actors to pursuing certain solutions to policy challenges and reject viable alternatives. Germany, the strongest economic nation in Europe, has a special responsibility in this situation, and Germany takes this responsibility. The happy history of Germany after World War II, the development into a free, unified and strong country, cannot be separated from European history, not even in thought. ... Germany lives in the European Union in a union of destiny. We owe it decades of peace, prosperity, and friendship with our neighbors. 33 The notion of the EU as a peace-promoting "union of destiny" was picked up by Foreign Minister Westerwelle two days later when he addressed the Bundestag:
Even if Europe hadn't brought anything but our peaceful coexistence on this continent over the past decades, it would have already paid off. Europe is a matter of destiny, a matter of peace, an insurance for prosperity for all citizens on this continent. 34 Here the political leaders follow the narrative of German postwar governments by stressing the EU's merits as a promoter of peace and prosperity. A link between this political stability and the future of Greece, however, is not explicitly made. In the meantime, severe budget cuts have led to social unrest in Greece, and most notably the strengthening of Golden Dawn, a right-wing extremist party. In this context, the German government's effort to link the Euro to political stability, peace, and prosperity, rested on shoring up Germany's contribution to the bail-out package, rather than a clear commitment to maintaining Greece's membership of the Euro. number one exporter, the country's economy has benefitted from the single currency and the single market. 38 The government therefore has a keen interest in keeping the Euro and expresses this time and again. Schäuble, for instance, has said:
Without the common currency we would have different problems. We have in Germany the lowest youth unemployment in the whole of Europe. Our economic success is strongly linked to the export strength, on which we existentially depend. We wouldn't be able to keep our standard of living and our social security if we weren't so successful on the export markets. For this, the economic integration of Europe is an important precondition. All of us in Europe are individually far too small to realize our interests in the globalized world. We need a common, capable of acting Europe. 39 Merkel faced a major challenge to communicate a "keeping the Euro at all cost" story that would satisfy both German and international opinion. A pro-integration strategic narrative has been difficult to construct in the absence of a unified narrative from the German government, with the result that a number of prominent politicians, such as We are convinced that it was right to negotiate in Europe on a give-andtake basis. It means that we were prepared to give solidarity. But we also wanted to do what was in the interest of the citizens of Germany and Europe as a whole, and ask member states to do their homework. 42 Not surprisingly, this narrative was picked up by the Italian-speaking media. The
Italian Huffington Post, for example, highlighted that more than anything else, Merkel's statement was directed towards the German public: "For the German
Chancellor, Angela Merkel, everybody in the EU has to do his homework … After all, the exams never end. Clearly, Merkel is in the midst of her election campaign." 43 Merkel's "everybody has to do his homework" narrative has been picked up by the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, who used it to stress that "Berlin, too, needs to do its homework if Germany wants to remain competitive." 44 By this point, then, the blame for the crisis is apportioned and the different actors hold each other responsible.
Another interesting change in the narrative is that from 2011 onwards, parallels between Greece's and the German Democratic Republic's (GDR) situation have been drawn by the German government. For example, when Merkel argued that the EU treaties needed to be changed in order to allow for more fiscal integration and flexibility, she made the following comparison: "Just as we managed to set up a twoplus-four treaty within six months in the context of German reunification, it should be possible to make common treaty changes because we should value the Euro." 45 Shortly afterwards on 14 November 2011, Schäuble compared the Greek economy to that of the GDR in the summer of 1990 when the D-Mark was introduced. 46 He declared:
Missed opportunities can no longer be covered up with currency manipulations. We have experienced this in Germany. When in the summer of 1990 the Deutschmark was introduced in the GDR, their economy was from one second to the other no longer competitive. Greece has to face similar pressures now. This is hard for the people. But there is no choice: Greece has to do this. It is the price one has to pay for being in a common currency.
These comparisons can be understood as the effort to explain the extent of Greece's economic difficulties to the German public by appealing to their own experience. At the same time, the international audience could understand it as a reminder to follow Germany's relatively recent, successful example of a currency union. The comparison between Greece and the GDR is however deeply problematic: not only were financial markets and rating agencies less influential in 1990, 47 but it also needs to be kept in mind that East Germany received an enormous amount of public funding to get the economy going. By contrast, the Greek, Italian, and Portuguese governments were put under pressure to make significant budgetary cuts and to pay off their debts. The German Euro narrative remains split between those claiming the Euro has been a burden for Germany and those who argue Germany has benefitted more than others from the single currency and should therefore expect to contribute more to uphold the Euro. 50 This split has been reinforced by the growth in support for the Euroskeptic Alternative for Germany, with signs that it can expect to rely on support from those disaffected by membership of the Euro within Germany. Acceptance of the German Euro narrative is far from straightforward. As noted above, Germany has come under sustained criticism from the U.S. and the IMF of its handling of the Eurozone crisis and its economic policy. 51 Adam Tooze argues that the incomprehension of other EU member states of Germany's domestic fiscal tightening focuses the attention on austerity and avoids serious discussion on a growth strategy to address the Eurozone's weaknesses. 52 Germany's narrative is defined by embedded domestic narratives that limit the range of policy options available at the EU level. Konrad Jarausch argues that this German nationalized narrative, which is associated with the emergence of the Berlin Republic, hinders Germany's engagement with the challenges it currently faces. He argues that: "Only a denationalized and democratized narrative will be able fully to reflect such new and complex problems after reunification." 53 Merkel has had to walk a fine line between a domestic audience that was unforgiving of the presumed transgressions of Southern Europeans, on one hand, and
Germany's continued national interest in an integrated Europe, on the other-the latter required Germany to make the extra commitments (mostly of financial support) that the domestic audience did not want to make. On balance Merkel has pursued a narrative that mostly favors the preferred policies of the domestic audience (as well as a number of other fiscally conservative member states), namely imposing the burden of adjustment on the peripheral countries of Europe. But, this also points to the fact that there are several enduring cleavages among member states that no narrative on its own can fundamentally alter.
We suggest the following implications of this analysis. First, the Merkel government's EU narrative will continue to balance competing domestic and European pressures. Merkel appeals to feelings of solidarity and unity from her domestic audience, but also promotes austerity for Greece and other debt-ridden countries. She is under increasing pressure to promote economic growth, not least from within her own coalition government with the SPD. Secondly, the government's "we're all in the same boat" language is unconvincing so long as Merkel makes clear that Germany is not in a crisis and that Germany has "done its homework" (by lowering production costs etc.), presenting a German position which seems out of touch with many of its EU partners, and avoiding collective responsibility. At times, the German Musterknabe (model boy) appears more like the class swot, rather than setting an inclusive example.
A final point emerging from our analysis is the issue of audience. To whom are the strategic narratives of the Eurozone crisis addressed? Taking Robert Putnam's two level game metaphor, 54 it might be suggested that the German narrative is designed to enlarge domestic and European "win sets," which may allow heads of government and state to find an intergovernmental agreement. Crespy and Schmidt's analysis suggests that rather than separating the domestic and the international win sets in line with Putnam's argument, the Euro crisis demonstrates a "double game" of simultaneous attempts to shape the discursive terrain on which the Euro crisis is negotiated. 55 Merkel has been adept in adapting her Euro narrative to respond to negotiated agreements with her EU colleagues to maintain a majority within Germany for her stance, while reinforcing her preference for the need for reforms in Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain. Ireland's response to the impact of the Euro crisis has been praised by Merkel and viewed as a signal that her policy is working. 56 As such, this suggests that, despite calls for a softening of Germany's position, Germany 
